Since the 1980s, successive American administrations have focused almost exclusively on merchandise trade—exports and imports of tangible goods—while downplaying, if not outright excluding, the significant surplus the US enjoys in services and sales, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
Source: https://www.wikidata.orgThis selective accounting distorts the real economic balance, particularly with countries like Malaysia, and fuels false narratives about the American decline. For Malaysia, the implications are significant. Malaysia’s trade with the US is heavily scrutinised in goods: semiconductors, refined petroleum, furniture, and rubber gloves. The omission of services is not merely a technical quirk—it is a strategic blind spot with geopolitical consequences.
The US economy is fundamentally service based
with services constituting over 77 per cent of the US gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2025. This includes high-margin sectors like finance, insurance,
intellectual property licensing, legal consulting, digital platforms, and
education.
American firms like Google, Microsoft, Meta, and
Netflix generate billions in digital service revenues abroad—revenues which
often go untaxed, untracked, or underreported in bilateral trade statistics. Take
Malaysia, for example. While the US routinely posts a goods trade deficit with
Malaysia—largely due to electronics, palm oil derivatives, and rubber
products—it enjoys a substantial and growing surplus in services.
American universities recruit Malaysian
students. US technology (tech) firms earn from advertising, cloud storage, and
software subscriptions. Professional services, legal advisories, management
consulting, and intellectual property (IP) royalties further tip the scale. Yet
none of this is properly counted when the US complains of being “cheated” by
Malaysia or Asean countries.
Why does the US exclude services? The answer is
partly political. Trade deficits, when measured only in goods, make for easy
headlines. They provide ammunition for nationalist agendas, especially under
administrations like Donald Trump’s. In this distorted view, countries like
China, Vietnam, and Malaysia appear as villains running surpluses at America’s
expense. But if services were included, the picture would change dramatically.
The US ran a global surplus in services—nearly US$300 billion in 2024. Its surplus with Asia is even more pronounced in sectors like cloud computing, e-commerce logistics, financial technology, and software-as-a-service (SaaS). Including these would undercut the very rationale for tariffs, sanctions, and supply chain decoupling policies aimed at the Asian economies. By refusing to account for the services surplus, Washington perpetuates outdated trade assumptions, ignoring how value is now added not just in factories, but in data centres, virtual classrooms, and financial technology (fintech) platforms. The omission of services also reveals deeper contradictions in the American hegemony. On one hand, the US demands that Asia respect intellectual property rights, open up digital markets, and align with Western data governance norms. On the other hand, it refuses to transparently account for its own dominance in these very sectors.
When US policymakers believe they are in economic decline based on skewed statistics, they overreact—imposing tariffs, reshoring industries, and pressing allies to decouple from China. This distorts global trade flows and puts Asean in an uncomfortable position of having to choose sides, despite its non-aligned ethos.
A real partnership requires honesty, especially in a
post-pandemic world where services and digital flows define economic power. The
US must modernise its trade narratives to reflect its real strengths. By
continuing to exclude services, it not only misreads its position but risks
alienating the very partners it needs in Asia. America’s trade deficit is less
a reflection of weakness than a failure to count what truly counts.
Reference:
Blog by Phar Kim Beng, Professor of Asean studies,
International Islamic University Malaysia, 19 April 2025