Power is one of the more contestable concepts
in political theory. It is conventional and convenient to define it as “the
ability to effect the outcomes you want and, if necessary, to change the
behavior of others to make this happen.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.)
In recent decades, scholars and commentators
have chosen to distinguish between two kinds of power, “hard” and “soft.” The
former, hard power, is achieved through military threat or use, and by means of
economic menace or reward. The latter, soft power, is the ability to have
influence by co-opting others to share some of one’s values and, as a
consequence, to share some key elements on one’s agenda for international order
and security. Hard power requires its addressees to consider their interests in
terms mainly of calculable costs and benefits. Soft power works through the
persuasive potency of ideas that foreigners find attractive. It is highly
desirable if much of the world external to America wants, or can be brought to
want, a great deal of what America happens to favor also. Americans want to
believe that the soft power of their civilization and culture is truly potent.
American culture is so powerful a programmer
that it can be difficult for Americans to empathize with, or even understand,
the somewhat different values and their implications held by others abroad. The
idea is popular, even possibly authoritative, among Americans that the U.S. is
not just an “ordinary country,” but instead exceptionally blessed (by divine
intent) and, exceptionally obliged to lead Mankind. When national
exceptionalism is not merely a proposition, but is an iconic item of faith, it
is difficult for usually balanced American minds to consider the potential of
their soft power. American values, broadly speaking “the American way,” are
attractive beyond America’s frontiers and have some utility for U.S. policy.
But there are serious limitations to the worth of the concept of soft power.
When considered closely, the subject of soft
power and its implications for the hard power of military force reveals a
number of plausible working propositions as suggested by Prof. Colin S. Gray.
1.
Hard
military threat and use are more difficult to employ today than was the case in
the past, in part because of the relatively recent growth in popular respect for
universal humanitarian values;
2.
The
political and other contexts for the use of force today do not offer authoritative
guidance for the future;
3.
The
utility of military force is not a fixed metric value, either universally or
for the United States;
4.
For
both good and for ill, ethical codes are adapted and applied under the pressure
of more or less stressful circumstances, and tend to be significantly
situational in practice;
5.
War
involves warfare, which means military force, which means violence that causes
damage, injury, and death;
6.
By
and large, soft power should not be thought of as an instrument of policy.
America is what it is, and the ability of Washington to project its favored
“narrative(s)” is heavily constrained;
7.
Soft
power cannot sensibly be regarded as a substantial alternative to hard military
power;
8.
An
important inherent weakness of soft power as an instrument of policy is that it
utterly depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners;
9.
Soft
power tends to be either so easy to exercise that it is probably in little need
of any policy push;
10.
Hard
and soft power should be complementary, though often they are not entirely so;
and
11.
Provided
the different natures of hard and soft power are understood—coercion versus
attraction—it is appropriate to regard the two kinds of power as mutual
enablers.
From all the factors above, it follows that
military force will long remain an essential instrument of policy. That said,
popular enthusiasm in Western societies for the placing of serious restraints
on the use of force can threaten the policy utility of the military. Soft power
tends to work well when America scarcely has need of it. And in a world full of
nuclear weapons it maybe best to “walk softly and carry a big stick...”
(Theodore Roosevelt).
Through fiscal year 2020, the U.S. Federal
Government has spent or obligated USD6.4 trillion on wars in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iraq. This excludes macroeconomic costs to the U.S. economy,
opportunity cost and future interest on borrowings. All current wars have been
paid for almost entirely by borrowings.
Source: David
Mdzinarishvili © Reuters
vs
Source: www.qsrmagazine.com
Reference:
1. Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force
as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century, Colin S Gray, Prof.
Of International Policy and Strategic Studies at University of Reading, England
2. Costs of War, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs
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